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Editor’s Note: The following essay is drawn from the Diplomat’s 
Forum lecture presented at the University of Kansas School of Law on 
November 1, 2012, by Mr. Sean Hagan, the General Counsel of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The Diplomat’s Forum is a 
component of the School’s multi-faceted International and Comparative 
Law Program.  Earlier lectures presented in the Diplomat’s Forum have 
featured prominent public servants who have dedicated their careers to 
diplomacy of various sorts—all working toward an overall goal of 
improving international relations at all levels.  Those individuals have 
typically served as representatives of their own national governments, 
including Japan, Austria, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia, to name a 
few.  The 2012 Diplomat’s Forum featured a somewhat different sort of 
diplomat.  The General Counsel of the International Monetary Fund 
serves in a key diplomatic role, for the IMF itself represents a 
multilateral effort by nearly all nations in the world to collaborate on an 
ever-increasing range of international economic issues.  In doing so, the 
IMF—and its Legal Department, of course—continually grapples with 
some of the world’s most difficult problems involving deep cultural, 
political, and ideological divides, as well as opportunities to bridge those 
divides. It should be noted that, since this talk was delivered almost five 
years ago, the Eurozone crisis has abated to a considerable degree. This 
is due, in large part, to the implementation of the policies that were 
recommended in these remarks. 
In keeping with common practice followed by the KANSAS LAW 
REVIEW in publishing lectures of this sort, and consistent with the 
character of the Diplomat’s Forum lecture in particular, this article is 
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structured more in the form of an essay than a traditional law journal 
article. 
*  *  *  *  *  * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The topic that I have chosen for my remarks is the Eurozone Crisis. I 
have chosen this topic not only because it is timely but also because it is 
a global—and not just a regional—issue.  How the Eurozone deals with 
its ongoing problems will not only have enormous impact on the people 
who live there, but also on the global economy.  As you all know, we 
live in a global village.  The complex and interlocking network of trade 
and capital flows have brought major economic gains and have lifted 
millions out of poverty.  But—and we have seen this from the most 
recent global financial crisis—our interconnectedness carries important 
risks as well as benefits.  A crisis in one region can have enormous 
spillover effects in another—including, for example, here in the United 
States.  About a fifth of United States exports go to Europe and, before 
the crisis, the US S&P top 500 companies were earning 20 percent of 
their profits in Europe.  Moreover, European-owned companies employ 
approximately 3.5 million people. So the ability of the United States to 
restore robust growth and job creation after the most severe crisis since 
the great depression will be greatly affected by how the Eurozone crisis 
is resolved. 
In my remarks today, I will try to identify what I believe to be the 
key ingredients to a durable resolution of the problems being 
encountered by the Eurozone.  Not surprisingly, my perspective on these 
issues is shaped by the fact that I am a staff member of the IMF, which 
has been actively involved in providing both policy advice and financial 
and assistance to a number of Eurozone members.  At the same time, the 
views I am expressing here are my own and may not always reflect those 
of the IMF. 
In my view, a sustainable recovery by the Eurozone from this period 
of instability and uncertainty will require progress in three distinct but 
interrelated areas: first, effective economic adjustment by its individual 
members; second, adequate external financing to support this adjustment 
process; and finally, greater integration among Eurozone members. Let’s 
discuss each of these areas in turn. 
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II. ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 
First, there is a need for economic adjustment by individual 
Eurozone members. When the IMF provides financing to one of our 
member countries, we are required to ensure that the country in question 
is taking the steps needed to resolve the underlying problem.  We cannot 
provide financing for the purpose of simply deferring its resolution, even 
though, from the country’s perspective, it may be preferable to do so.  
This provides the basis for what is generally referred to as IMF 
“conditionality,” where our financing is made contingent upon the 
country’s design and implementation of an economic adjustment 
program that is designed to enable the country to resolve the underlying 
cause of its problems. 
In the case of those Eurozone members with whom the IMF 
currently has programs for financial assistance, it is clear that the 
adjustment process will be a long and difficult one. All of these countries 
have extremely high debt levels.  One of the benefits for a country 
adopting the euro and entering the Eurozone was that it would thereby be 
able to access capital markets with considerable ease—indeed they were 
able to borrow at rates that were only slightly higher than those 
applicable to Germany.  A key objective of the programs we are 
supporting is the adoption of policies by the country in question that will 
reduce this debt to a sustainable level.  How is this achieved?  While 
fiscal consolidation—that is, a reduction in expenditures and an increase 
in revenues through taxation—has an important role to play in this 
process, the IMF is keenly aware that the pace of this adjustment needs 
to be carefully calibrated, taking into account the circumstances of the 
country.  On the one hand, the establishment of a sufficiently specific 
and credible policy framework that places public finances on a 
sustainable path over the medium is critical to restoring market 
confidence and minimizing uncertainty.  We see that not only in Europe, 
of course, but also in the United States.  On the other hand, however, if 
the pace of fiscal consolidation is too fast, it will not only create 
excessive social costs but will be economically counterproductive, since 
it can undermine growth, adversely affecting the level of tax revenues. 
Indeed, in the final analysis, a durable resolution of the debt 
problems of these countries requires the adoption of policies that will 
generate economic growth.  A country’s debt level is only sustainable if 
it can grow out of its debt.  This is why economists, and markets as well, 
assess the sustainability of a country’s debt level by measuring it as a 
percentage of its GDP. 
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So the key question for these countries—and for institutions such as 
the IMF who are providing them with financial support—is how to 
generate growth.  And here, I think there is a consensus that perhaps the 
most important source of growth is an increase in the competitiveness of 
the country relative to its trading partners.  It is for this reason that the 
core of all of the IMF-supported programs involves the adoption of 
policies that are designed to increase competitiveness.  Increasing the 
competitiveness in these countries, however, is a complex task.  One of 
the consequences of the large amount of borrowing that generated 
current debt levels is that the inflow of money into these economies 
resulted in a significant increase in prices, which has then undermined 
competitiveness. 
Normally, the solution to this problem is for a country to allow its 
currency to depreciate relative to other currencies, since such 
depreciation makes the country’s exports cheaper.  Of course, this 
instrument is not available to countries that are members of a currency 
union, since they do not have their own individual currencies.  Rather, in 
their case, a reduction in prices needs to rely on structural policies, 
including policies that will increase productivity and lower unit labor 
costs. 
Such structural policies are socially painful—and, for a transitional 
period, they can also be a drag on growth.  For example, while a move 
toward more competitive wages will eventually make the economy more 
competitive, in the short term it will reduce demand. 
I would note that the issue of whether the prices of southern 
Eurozone country are sufficiently competitive will also depend on the 
prices in northern Eurozone countries, their trading partners.  
Competitiveness is a relative concept.  For this reason, efforts to make 
the economies of the south more competitive through a reduction in 
prices will be enhanced by corresponding increases in prices in countries 
of the north—increases which can be achieved through, among other 
things, the toleration of a higher level of inflation in these countries. 
 Whatever approach is followed, it is clear that the adjustment path 
is a narrow, long and steep one.  Nevertheless, the governments of those 
Eurozone members with whom we have programs have decided to 
pursue this path because they have recognized that the alternative would 
be even more painful.  Unfortunately, public policy is often about 
choosing between difficult alternatives.  While the departure from the 
Eurozone and the introduction of their own currencies would enable such 
countries to achieve competitiveness more quickly through a 
depreciation of those new currencies, it would also result in considerable 
economic dislocation. 
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Why?  Because the external debt of the government, banks, 
corporations, and individuals in each of these countries is all 
denominated in euros, there would be widespread insolvency due to the 
fact that, with the inevitable depreciation of the new currency, this debt 
would have suddenly become much more difficult to service.  And 
finally, for each of these countries, being a member of the Eurozone has 
served important social and political objectives, and these countries have 
no doubt judged that a departure would, from that perspective, be too 
traumatic. 
III. EXTERNAL FINANCING 
Allow me to turn to the second ingredient for success: the 
availability of adequate external financing that will support the 
adjustment process.  Both the source and the scale of financing will 
depend on the circumstances of the country in question. 
For example, there are those countries—such as Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland—that have lost access to capital markets because of 
investors’ lack of confidence in the ability of those countries to service 
their debt.  In these cases, the financing needed will come from the 
official sector, and it will need to be very large.  While a country will 
seek to generate savings to meet its financing needs—including the 
financing of its large debt—it cannot tighten its belt too fast if it wishes 
to avoid undermining growth, as I indicated earlier. Accordingly, 
financial support provided by the official sector can be seen as filling the 
gap and giving the country more time to implement its adjustment 
programs—and for these programs to generate the needed results.  As 
these adjustment efforts take hold, the objective is for these members to 
be in a position to regain access to capital markets.  The more financing 
is available, the more gradual the adjustment process can be.  In Europe, 
the official sector financing provided to these countries has come 
primarily from the IMF and the EFSF, the European Financial Stability 
Fund.  The recent establishment by the Eurozone of the European 
Stability Mechanism, which is a permanent institution that succeeds the 
EFSF, is a very welcome development in this regard. 
But just as there are limits to how quickly a member may adjust, so 
there are also limits to the amount of credit that can be provided by the 
official sector.  The resources of the IMF are finite and, in Europe, we 
have seen that there are political constraints on how much financing 
national parliaments are willing to appropriate for this purpose.  But 
perhaps more fundamentally, there may be circumstances in which 
further credit by the official sector will in fact become 
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counterproductive.  This situation arises where the debt of the country in 
question is so high that it is judged to be unsustainable – that is, where 
under any reasonable adjustment scenario the debt cannot be reduced as 
a percentage of GDP.  Since financing by the IMF and the European 
institutions creates more debt, our support would exacerbate rather than 
resolve the problem.  In these circumstances, the only available course of 
action is for the country to obtain relief through a debt restructuring.  In 
effect, the country finds breathing room while it adjusts—but not through 
new borrowing; rather, that breathing room comes by way of a reduction 
in the cost of servicing its debt. 
This is the strategy that was recently pursued by Greece, where an 
agreement was reached with private creditors that involved a 75 percent 
reduction in the net present value of their claims on Greece.  
Interestingly, although the restructuring did not involve a contractual 
default, the only reason why creditors agreed to reduce the value of their 
claims was through a credible threat of default. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there are countries such as Spain, 
which, although it is going through a painful adjustment process, has not 
lost its access to capital markets. Because of uncertainties, however, 
markets have increased interest rates that they charge for these 
countries—a dynamic which, if left unchecked, could result in a 
complete loss of market access.  In these circumstances, financing by the 
official sector can play what is referred to as a catalytic role.  In essence, 
a commitment of resources by the official sector in support of strong 
adjustment policies that the official sector endorses can catalyze a 
restoration of market confidence and, accordingly, lower market costs.  
In fact, the mere availability of these resources, even if they are not 
drawn by the member, may have a salutary effect.  This is often referred 
to as precautionary or backstop financing.  The recent announcement by 
the European Central Bank of its Outright Market Transaction Program 
represents a major breakthrough in the establishment of a financial 
backstop for these countries. In essence, the ECB has announced that it is 
willing to purchase an unlimited amount of the sovereign bonds in the 
secondary market of those countries that have adjustment programs 
supported by the ESM and the IMF.  Among other things, this will 
ensure that countries following the right policies can finance themselves 
at reasonable costs while they undertake the needed policy adjustments. 
IV. FURTHER INTEGRATION 
This brings me to the third and final ingredient for success in Europe.  
No matter how credible the economic adjustment is by individual 
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countries and no matter how significant the external financing generated 
by European institutions and the IMF may be, a durable solution to the 
Eurozone crisis will require further integration among Eurozone 
members. Indeed, one could argue that the crisis is a crisis of incomplete 
integration, with markets questioning the long term viability of the euro 
project. 
There are at least two areas where further integration is needed.  Let 
me explore each of these briefly. 
V. . . .  IN BANKING REGULATION 
The first area in which further integration is needed lies in the area 
banking regulation.  One of the consequences of the creation of the euro 
was the development of a single financial market.  While this has 
brought a number of benefits, the crisis has demonstrated that the 
stability of this market can no longer be supported by legal and 
institutional frameworks that operate—and are backstopped financially—
on a national basis. When times were good, the activity of large cross-
border banks clearly overwhelmed the supervisory capacity of the 
national bank regulators—in both home and host countries.  And when 
banks weaken, the reliance on national approaches to bank 
recapitalization and resolution can weaken the finances of the 
government—as was amply demonstrated in the case of Ireland. 
For this reason, the IMF has long argued for the creation of a 
banking union within the Eurozone, one which would be based on three 
interdependent pillars.  The first is the creation of a single euro area bank 
supervisory agency, which would replace the existing “co-ordinated” 
national supervisory framework.  While there would still be scope for 
national representation in the new supervisory agency, the existence of a 
new European institution, with a strong central governance framework, 
would ensure that supervision is conducted from a euro area (rather than 
national) perspective. 
Second, the creation of a euro area bank resolution authority is 
needed.  Recent experience has demonstrated that national resolution 
frameworks are not able to resolve large financial groups in a manner 
that both ensures financial stability and limits moral hazard.  A new euro 
area resolution institution would be in a position to resolve financial 
groups rapidly and in a manner that ensures an adequate contribution by 
key stakeholders. 
Third, a single euro area deposit insurance and resolution fund 
should be established.  The existing national deposit insurance funds 
have proven inadequate to support large banks and have placed a strain 
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on national treasuries. The creation of a euro area deposit insurance 
system would address this problem and would go a long way in 
enhancing confidence in the banking system. 
Progress is being made in the creation of the first of these three 
elements of a banking union.  Specifically, at the euro area summit in 
June 2012, it was agreed that a single supervisory mechanism would be 
created by the end of 2012.  While this is a very welcome step, my own 
view is that the remaining two pillars—a euro area resolution authority 
and a deposit insurance fund—also need to be put in place as soon as 
possible, even though I recognize that they will have fiscal consequences 
for Eurozone. 
VI. . . .  IN FISCAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 
This brings me to the second area where further progress is needed—
that of further fiscal integration.  One of the lessons of the current crisis 
is that it is not tenable for seventeen completely independent fiscal 
policies to sit alongside one monetary policy.  The agreement that has 
been reached among the Eurozone members on the creation of a fiscal 
compact—which imposes legally binding limits on the deficits of euro 
members—is therefore welcome.  However, imposing limits on 
borrowing needs to be complemented with further expenditures at the 
euro area level to support stability. 
I know that this is a very sensitive subject.  And at one level, the 
crisis has already generated greater fiscal integration with the 
establishment of the EFSF and now the ESM, both of which are funded 
by national authorities.  But this represents spending that is ad hoc and 
provided after the crisis has hit, which makes it more expensive.  
Moreover, it can give rise to recurring market risk as to the adequacy of 
resources.  What is needed is a more automatic crisis prevention fiscal 
risk sharing framework that supports individual members going through 
a downturn in a manner that reduces the likelihood that these downturns 
will turn into a crisis for the entire area.  This assistance could take the 
form of temporary transfers from the federal budget that would provide a 
safety net for vulnerable groups.  Moreover, since a euro area resolution 
authority and a deposit insurance fund will require financing, the creation 
of a banking union will also require further fiscal integration.  Various 
ideas have been proposed as to how these expenditures would be 
financed, including for example, through the creation of short term 
securities issued by the Eurozone as a whole. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Let me offer some overarching observations.  The good news is that 
progress has been made in all of the areas that I have identified as being 
critical for success.  Euro area members are implementing economic 
adjustment measures that are designed to put their public finance in order 
and enhance their competitiveness.  With respect to external financing, 
the European Stability Mechanism and the OMT represent important 
breakthroughs.  And with respect to further integration, the intention to 
establish a supervisory authority represents an important step.  The 
difficulty, however, is that more needs to be done and the market 
continues to be impatient with the pace of reform.  The OTM programs 
need to be used earlier rather than later.  Banking union needs to be 
complete.  Some of the measures that I have mentioned are politically 
sensitive and will take time to put in place—including in the area of 
fiscal integration.  However, even the establishment of a roadmap for 
future reform in these areas would enhance market confidence in the 
short term. 
 For its part, the IMF continues to stand ready to provide both 
analytical and financial support.  As I indicated at the outset, the entire 
international community has a stake in the successful resolution of this 
crisis.  And as a universal institution charged with securing international 
financial stability and enhancing the growth of our 185 member 
countries, the IMF considers the Eurozone crisis to be a matter of its 
utmost concern—and has therefore placed its highest priority on helping 
define a path to recover from it. 
 
 
 
 
 
